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Abstract
We nd that di¤erences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic in-
teraction imply di¤erences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulate the
availability of cognitive resources by applying a di¤erential cognitive load. In cognitive
load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive re-
sources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive
resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources will be available for de-
liberation on the choice. Although much is known about how subjects make decisions
under a cognitive load, little is known about how this a¤ects behavior in strategic games.
We run an experiment in which subjects play a repeated multi-player prisoners dilemma
game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects are placed under a
high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other are placed
under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). We nd that the behavior of the
subjects in the low load condition converges to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
prediction at a faster rate than those in the high load treatment. However, we do not
nd the corresponding relationship involving outcomes in the game. Specically, there is
no evidence of a signicantly di¤erent convergence of game outcomes across treatments.
As an explanation of these two results, we nd evidence that low load subjects are better
able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.
Keywords: cognitive resources, experimental economics, experimental game theory, public
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1 Introduction
There have been advancements in the understanding of play in games based on the con-
ceptualization that players devote heterogenous levels of cognition to deliberation on their
strategy (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Camerer et
al., 2004). These advancements specify that the players exhibit heterogenous levels of strate-
gic sophistication. This conceptualization is often supported by observing play in a game
and determining whether the hierarchical model improves the t with the observations. In
addition to comparing the predictions with the observations, these models are also supported
by the measurement of data related to the level of cognition. For instance studies measuring
the decision to lookup relevant and available information,1 eyetracking studies which measure
the location of the attention of the subject,2 and even neurological data3 have been seen as
providing evidence in support of these hierarchical models.
In a rough sense, these papers ask the questions, "Are there brains in games?" and "If so,
what else can we say?" In our paper, rather than measure the level of cognition or measure
data related to the level of cognition, we manipulate the level of cognition. In this sense, the
present paper is another way of asking, "Are there brains in games?" and "If so, what else
can we say?"
In the experiment described below, we nd a relationship between the heterogenous ability
to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction and behavior in the interaction. This
heterogeneity arises because we apply a di¤erential cognitive load on subjects who are playing
the game. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a memorization
task in parallel to making a choice in another domain. This additional memorization task
occupies cognitive resources, which cannot be devoted to deliberation about the choice. In
this sense, the condition of subjects under a larger cognitive load could be thought of as similar
to the condition of subjects with a diminished ability to reason.
Much is known about the behavior of subjects under a cognitive load. For instance, the
1See Camerer et al. (1993), Johnson et al. (2002), Crawford (2008), Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) and
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006).
2For instance, see Wang et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2010).
3For instance, see Coricelli and Nagel (2009).
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literature nds that subjects under a larger cognitive load tend to be more impulsive and less
analytical. However, little is known about how the cognitive load a¤ects play in strategic
games.4
This experiment seeks to begin to clarify the relationship between cognitive load and
behavior in games. Further, due to the similarity between cognitive load and the diminished
ability to reason, the experiment seeks to shed light on the relationship between intelligence
and behavior in games. One might be tempted to conclude that the diminished ability to
reason would generate obvious predictions; for instance that subjects under a larger cognitive
load will be more cooperative in the prisoners dilemma game. However, the predictions
on this front are far from obvious due to recent ndings of a positive relationship between a
measure of intelligence and cooperation in the repeated prisoners dilemma game.5
In our experiment, we impose a cognitive load on subjects who are playing repeated multi-
player prisoners dilemma game. In each period, subjects are told to memorize a number. In
the low load treatment, this is a small number and therefore relatively easy to remember. In
the high load treatment, the number is large and therefore relatively di¢ cult to remember.
The subjects then play a four-player prisoners dilemma game. After the subjects make their
choice in the game, they are asked to recall the number. As suggested above, subjects in
the low load condition are better able to commit cognitive resources in order to deliberate on
their action in the game.
Of course, the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the nitely repeated multi-
player prisoners dilemma game is for each player to select the uncooperative action in every
period. As with most experimental investigations of the prisoners dilemma game, we do not
observe this. We do nd that the behavior of the subjects in the low load condition converges
to the SPNE prediction at a faster rate than those in the high load treatment. However,
we do not nd the corresponding relationship involving game outcomes. Specically, there is
no evidence of a signicantly di¤erent convergence of game outcomes across treatments. A
4Researchers have also studied the e¤ects of the contraints on the complexity of strategies on outcomes in
the nitely repeated prisoners dilemma game. For instance, see Neyman (1985, 1998). Also see Béal (2010)
for a more recent reference. Our study can be thought to perform a similar exercise in the laborary.
5For instance, see Jones (2008).
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potential explanation for these two results, is our nding that low load subjects are better
able to adjust their strategy in response to previous outcomes. As a result, these subjects are
better able to identify temporary, advantageous situations in which additional surplus could
be captured. Further, this agility o¤sets the trend towards playing uncooperatively. These
results combine to suggest that the availability of cognitive resources a¤ects strategic behavior.
1.1 Related Literature
The cognitive load literature nds that subjects under a larger cognitive load tend to be more
impulsive and less analytical. These di¤erences in behavior stem from the fact that those
under a larger cognitive load are less able to devote cognitive resources to reect on their
decision. For instance, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) describe an experiment in which subjects
were given an option of eating an unhealthy cake or a healthy serving of fruit. The authors
found that the subjects were more likely to select the cake when they were under a high
cognitive load.
Much is known about how the cognitive load a¤ects subjects in nonstrategic settings. In
addition to being more impulsive and less analytical (Hinson et al., 2003) it has been found that
subjects under a cognitive load tend to be more risk averse and exhibit a higher degree of time
impatience (Benjamin et al., 2006), make more mistakes (Rydval, 2007), have less self control
(Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Ward and Mann, 2000), fail to process available information
(Gilbert et al., 1988; Swann et al., 1990), perform worse on gambling tasks (Hinson et al.
2002), are more susceptible to a social label (Cornelissen et al., 2007), and have di¤erent
evaluations of the fairness of outcomes (Cornelissen et al., 2011; van den Bos et al., 2006;
Hauge et al., 2009).
However, to our knowledge, there are only two papers which investigate the relationship
between the manipulation of cognitive load and behavior in games, Roch et al. (2000) and
Cappelletti et al. (2011). Roch et al. (2000) found that subjects under the low cognitive
load condition requested more resources in a common resource game. However, in Roch
et al. the subjects were not told the penalty if the sum of the groups requests were more
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than the amount to be divided. As a result, one cannot determine whether the cognitive
load manipulation implied di¤erences in strategic behavior or di¤erences in the regard for
instructions which are not incentivized.
Cappelletti et al. (2011) studied behavior in the ultimatum game and varied the ability of
the subject to deliberate by manipulating both time pressure and cognitive load. The authors
found that time pressure a¤ects the behavior of both proposer and responder. However, the
authors found that cognitive load does not a¤ect behavior as either a proposer or responder. In
contrast, we nd that cognitive load does a¤ect behavior in our setting. The di¤erence in the
e¢ cacy of the cognitive load manipulation is likely due to the di¤erences in its incentivization.
We further discuss this issue below.
There is a recent interest in the relationship between intelligence and preferences.6 This
literature nds a negative relationship between intelligence and both risk aversion and time
impatience. We note the similarities between the ndings in the intelligence literature and
those in the cognitive load literature. Therefore, to the extent that manipulating cognitive
load is analogous to manipulating the intelligence of the subject, we now discuss the small
literature on the relationship between intelligence and behavior in games.7 For instance,
Chen et al. (2009) measured the working memory of subjects and examined behavior in
double auctions. The authors found some evidence that subjects with a higher working
memory performed better. Devetag and Warglien (2003) found a relationship between the
working memory capacity of a subject and the congruence of play to equilibrium behavior.
Also Bednar et al. (2012) describe an experiment in which subjects simultaneously played
two distinct games with di¤erent opponents. The authors found that behavior in a particular
game was a¤ected by the corresponding paired game.8
Burnham et al. (2009) demonstrate a relationship between a measure of intelligence and
strategic behavior in a beauty contest game. In other words, the authors found that subjects
6See Frederick (2005), Benjmin et al. (2006), Burks et al. (2008) and Dohmen et al. (2010). See Ben-Ner
et al. (2004), Branstätter and Güth (2002), Chen et al. (2011a) and Millet and Dewitte (2007) for more on the
relationship between social preferences and measures of intelligence.
7Also see Bajo et al. (2011), Ballinger et al. (2011), Bayer and Renou (2011), Chen et al. (2011b), Jones
(2011), Palacios-Huerta (2003), Putterman et al. (2011) and Rydval (2007).
8Also see Savikhina and Sheremeta (2009).
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with a higher measure of intelligence selected actions which are closer to the Nash Equilib-
rium of the beauty contest. On the other hand, Jones (2008) found a relationship between
cooperation in the repeated prisoners dilemma and the average SAT scores at the university
where the experiment was conducted.9 In other words, Jones found a negative relationship
between a measure of intelligence and strategic behavior in the prisoners dilemma game.
Therefore, to the extent that an increased cognitive load simulates the e¤ect of a reduced
ability to reason, the two papers discussed above would seem to make opposite predictions
in our setting. Burnham et al. (2009) would seem to predict that subjects in the high load
treatment would exhibit more cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game and Jones (2008)
would seem to predict that outcomes in the high load treatment will exhibit less cooperation in
the prisoners dilemma game. The experiment which we describe below will help distinguish
between these two predictions.
The answer, as it turns out, is a bit more subtle. Across all periods, we nd very weak
evidence of a di¤erence between either the behavior or the game outcomes of the subjects in
the high and low load treatments. However, we nd that the behavior of the low load subjects
converges to the SPNE behavior at a faster rate than high load subjects. We also nd that
subjects in the low load treatment are better able to condition on past outcomes than are high
load subjects.
Finally, note that economists have become interested in studying the response times of
subjects.10 Research has found that longer response times are associated with more strategic
and less automatic reasoning. As we are manipulating the ability of the subjects to devote
cognitive resources to a problem, the response time will prove to be a useful measure of its
e¢ cacy. In other words, we use the response time as a measure of the cognitive resources
devoted to deliberation in the game.
9See Rydval and Ortmann (2004) for a similar result.
10For instance, Brañas-Garza and Miller (2008), Hogarth (1975), Piovesan and Wengström (2009), and
Rubinstein (2007)
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2 Method
A total of 60 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were graduate and
undergraduate students at Rutgers University-Camden. The experiment was conducted in
two sessions of 16, one session of 12, and two sessions of 8. The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects were matched with three other subjects in which they were to play a repeated
prisoners dilemma game. The subjects were told that the group would remain xed through-
out the experiment.11 The individual decision was to select X (the cooperative action) or Y
(the uncooperative action). Of the four subjects in the group, if x play X then selecting X
yields a payo¤ of 20x points whereas selecting Y yields 20x+ 40. The exchange rate was $1
for every 150 points. Additionally, the subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee. While making
a decision in the game, the subjects were provided with the payo¤s in two formats. The
subjects were told that both formats presented identical information. See the appendix for
the screen shown to the subjects during their decision in the game.
Before play in each period, the subject was given 15 seconds in which to commit a number
to memory. The subjects were aware that they would be asked to recall the number after
their choice was made in the game. There were two cognitive load treatments: in the low
load treatment subjects were directed to memorize a 2 digit number, and in the high load
treatment subjects were directed to memorize a 7 digit number. There were 26 subjects
in the low load treatment and 34 in the high load treatment. The subjects were told that
they would only receive payment in the periods in which they correctly recalled the number.
In other words, the subjects would receive nothing for the periods in which they incorrectly
recalled the number.
After each period, subjects were given feedback regarding play in the game, however they
were not given feedback about their performance on the memorization task. Across all
treatments, the composition of 12 of the 15 groups were homogenous, in that they contained
only a single load treatment. However, there were 3 groups which were mixed in the sense
11The instructions were given via power point slides. The slides, along with any experimental material, are
available from the corresponding author upon request.
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that that 2 subjects were in the low load treatment and 2 were in the high load treatment.
We refer to this group as mixed. The subjects were told nothing about the composition of
their group.
To summarize the timing in each period, subjects were given the number (7 digits or 2
digits), they made their choice in the game, they were asked to recall the number, and they
were given feedback on the game outcome but not the memorization task outcome. Each of
these stages were designed so that the subject would not proceed to the next stage until each
subject completes the prior stage. This procedure was repeated for 30 periods, with a new
number in each period. The average amount earned was $14:76.
At the conclusion of period 30, the subjects answered the following manipulation check
questions on a scale of 1 to 7: Which featured into your decisions between X and Y , your
prudent side or your impulsive side (1 prudent, 7 impulsive)? How di¢ cult was it for you to
recall your numbers (1 very di¢ cult, 7 not very di¢ cult)? How di¢ cult was it for you to decide
between X and Y (1 very di¢ cult, 7 not very di¢ cult)? How distracting was the memorization
task (1 very distracting, 7 not very distracting)? and How many of the memorization tasks
do you expect that you correctly answered (1 none correct, 7 all correct)?
The z-Tree output specied the time remaining when the Click to Proceed button was
pressed. In the output, there appeared instances of a time remaining of 99999. This output
seems to have occurred if the "Click to Proceed" button was pressed before the clock could
begin. In the stage in which the number was given to the subjects, we recorded the 56
instances of the 99999 output as 16 because 15 seconds were allotted. In the stage in which
the game was played, we recorded the 2 instances of the 99999 output as 31 because 30 seconds
were allotted. In the stage in which the number was to be recalled, we recorded the 5 instances
of the 99999 output as 16 because 15 seconds were allotted.
2.1 Discussion of the Experimental Design
Before we describe the results, we discuss the design of the experiment. Although the cognitive
load manipulation is rather common, to our knowledge, we are the only example of a paper in
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which the manipulation is repeated. As a result, it was not obvious to us whether we should
balance the experiment so that each subject would undergo the high and low loads an equal
number of times. However, we decided to keep the subjects in a single treatment throughout
the experiment. In part, this decision was due to the results in Dewitte et al. (2005) which
reports that the e¤ects of the cognitive load manipulation can be lasting. Also note that we
decided to use a 7 digit number as the high load manipulation because it is standard in the
literature and because Miller (1956) nds that this tends to be near the limit of the memory
of subjects.12
Also note that the bulk of the cognitive load literature does not incentivise the memo-
rization task. To our knowledge, Benjamin et al. (2006) and Cappelletti et al. (2011) are
the only examples of experiments with such material incentives. Cappelletti et al. (2011)
pays the subjects per correct digit. On the other hand, we pay the full amount earned in
the game for correct recall and we pay nothing for incorrect recall. However, like Cappelletti
et al. (2011), we provide no feedback regarding the accuracy of the memorization task. We
make these two design decisions in order to reduce the ability of the subject to strategically
allocate cognitive resources. In particular, we want to avoid providing an incentive for the
subject to seek an interior solution to the trade-o¤ between devoting cognitive resources for
the memorization task and deliberation on the game.
Another means of incentivising the cognitive load, without inducing possible di¤erences in
payment, is to pay the subjects based on the rank of correct answers within their treatment.
While this procedure has the advantage that payments across treatments would be equal, in
our view this is less satisfactory than our design. First, in order to make these instructions
comprehensible, we would have to explain to the subjects that there are di¤erent cognitive
load treatments. We had a preference to avoid informing the subjects that there would be
di¤erences in the treatment because we were concerned that the subjects in the high load
treatment might resent their di¢ cult task, and this resentment might a¤ect their behavior.
Second, the rank payment scheme would possibly encourage the subjects to seek an interior
solution to the trade-o¤ between devoting cognitive resources to the memorization task and
12Also, see Cowan (2001) for an updated view on the memory capacity literature.
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deliberation on the game. Again, if subjects can reduce their memory load, without signicant
nancial penalty, then it is likely that we would not observe the e¤ects of the treatment. When
considering the relative advantages of the rank payment scheme and the present experimental
design, it would seem that the latter is preferable.
Also note that we designed the experiment so that the subject would only enter the fol-
lowing stage when all other players completed the preceding stage. This was done in order
to mitigate the ability of the subjects to strategically decide the timing of their decisions. In
other words, due to our experimental design, there was little incentive for the subjects in the
low load condition to quickly leave the stage where they are given the number because they
would not immediately proceed to the game stage. Additionally, the subjects in the high load
condition could not quickly make their decision in the prisoners dilemma game, in order to
spill their number in the memorization task, because they would not immediately proceed to
the following stage.
Finally, we study the four-player prisoners dilemma13 because it has a few attractive
features for the purpose of examining the role of cognitive load in strategic games. The game
is relatively simple because the decision is binary and the game is linear. In order to keep
the game from being too complicated, we did not elect to use a more general public goods
game. On the other hand, the four-player version requires more thought than the two-player
version because outcomes depend on the actions of three opponents, rather than just one
opponent. Further, most of the subjects are familiar with the two-player version and would
likely import this prior experience into the experiment. For this reason, we employed the
four-player version.
3 Results
3.1 Manipulation checks and overview of the data
All ve of the manipulation check questions demonstrated signicant di¤erences between the
high and low load treatments. Specically, those in the high load treatment reported being
13See Komorita et al. (1980).
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more impulsive (p = 0:038),14 having more di¢ culty in recalling the number (p < 0:001),
having more di¢ culty in deciding on an action in the game (p = 0:098), found the memo-
rization task to be more distracting (p < 0:001), and expected to correctly recall the number
with lower precision (p = 0:005) than those in the low load treatment. Further, the sub-
jects in the high load treatment spent a signicantly longer time committing the number to
memory (M = 9:15, SD = 4:93) than did the subjects in the low load treatment (M = 1:19,
SD = 2:20), t(1798) = 42:1, p < 0:001.
Despite its di¢ culty, we were surprised by the success of the high load subjects on the
memorization task. In the high load treatment, 820 of the 1020 (80:4%) of the memorization
tasks were preformed correctly. By comparison, we note that 766 of 780 (98:2%) of the
memorization tasks in the low load were preformed correctly.
Finally, we provide an overview of the rates of cooperation in the experiment. In Table
1 below, we list the proportion of cooperation in the treatments by the period in which it
occurred.
Table 1 Cooperation rates by treatment and period
Periods 1  5 6  10 11  15 16  20 21  25 26  30 Total
High Load 0:494 0:406 0:365 0:341 0:318 0:365 0:381
Low Load 0:515 0:400 0:438 0:408 0:315 0:192 0:378
Table 1 suggests that subjects across both treatments converged to the SPNE behavior.
The table also suggests that the low load subjects converged to the SPNE behavior at a faster
rate than the high load subjects. We now investigate whether these impressions are correct.
3.2 Di¤erences in behavior
We now begin the analysis of the behavior of the subjects. We conduct this analysis with
cooperation in the game as the dependent variable. Here a value of 1 indicates that the
cooperative action (X) was selected and 0 indicates that that the uncooperative action (Y )
was selected. We use a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the subject was in the low
load treatment and 0 otherwise. We use a dummy variable indicating whether the group was
14These are the results of a one-sided t-test between the high and low load subjects.
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mixed and therefore contained subjects from both the high and low load treatments. Note
that the regressions below, and throughout the paper, which account for the xed-e¤ects are
specic to the subject rather than the group. While the groups are xed throughout the
experiment, there is subject-specic unobserved heterogeneity, which would remain constant
throughout the experiment. As a result, we conduct subject specic and not group specic
xed-e¤ects. See Table 2 for the results of these regressions.
Table 2 Logistic regressions of cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Period  0:0336  0:0399  0:0236  0:0267  0:0267
(0:00572) (0:00627) (0:00752) (0:00801) (0:00801)
Low Load     0:334    
(0:199)
Period-Low Load      0:0234  0:0336  0:0336
Interaction (0:0116) (0:0130) (0:0130)
Mixed-Low Load          3:3145
Interaction (4:0291)
Fixed-e¤ects? No Yes No Yes Yes
 2 Log L 2355:44 2049:69 2351:34 2042:90 2042:90
LR 2 35:19 340:94 39:28 347:73 347:73
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, where
* indicates signicance at 0.1, ** indicates signicant at 0.05, and *** indicates
signicance at 0.01. Each regression has 1800 observations.
The analysis summarized in Table 2 conrms our intuition from Table 1. First, note
that there is strong evidence of learning across periods. In every specication involving the
period, our results indicate that subjects played less cooperatively across time. In other
words, perhaps not surprisingly, we see convergence to the SPNE behavior. We also nd
weak evidence that subjects in the low load treatment are more generous than are subjects in
the high load treatment. We nd that the actions of the subjects in the high load treatment
converged to the SPNE behavior at faster rate than those in the low load treatment. This
relationship continues to hold when we account for the mixed nature of the groups. We
summarize the analysis of Table 2 with the following result.
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Result 1 Across both treatments, behavior converged to the SPNE behavior, however the
convergence was faster for the low load subjects.
3.3 Di¤erences in cognitive resources or di¤erences in expected payments?
One potential explanation for the di¤erences in the behavior of the subjects in the low load
and high load treatments relates to di¤erences in the expected payments across treatments.
It is possible that the high load subjects expected to earn less than the low load subjects, and
these di¤erences in expectations, rather than the di¤erences in the cognitive load, implied the
di¤erences in behavior. While it is not possible to determine the precise di¤erences in the
payment expectations, it is possible to look for evidence that the di¤erences in behavior were
motivated by this income e¤ect rather than the cognitive load.
One possibility is that the subjects in the high load treatment completely forgot the num-
ber, and therefore selected the action in the game with the knowledge that they would not
receive payment in that period. If this was the case then we would expect to see subjects
quickly entering an incorrect number so that the subject could use the time to rest and there-
fore perform better in the subsequent period. In other words, we will look for evidence that
high load subjects quickly entered incorrect responses to the memorization task. In Table 3
we demonstrate the relationship between the memorization task and the time remaining when
the stage was exited. In particular, we provide the number of correct responses, the number
of total responses, and the percent correct by the time remaining and the treatment.
Table 3 The number of correct memorization task responses, total
responses, and percent correct by time remaining and treatment
14 or more 13 or 12 11 or 10 9 or 8 7 or 6 5 or less
High Load 21 365 281 91 41 21
22 400 347 130 60 61
96% 91% 81% 70% 69% 34%
Low Load 414 287 46 16 1 2
421 287 48 17 1 6
98% 100% 96% 94% 100% 33%
In Table 3 we observe that relatively few incorrect responses to the memorization task
occur early in the stage. This suggests that it was not common for the subject to leave the
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game stage having forgotten the number because there is evidence that the subjects exerted
e¤ort to correctly perform the memorization task. The data summarized in Table 3 seems to
be consistent with the hypothesis that the subjects in both treatments attempted to correctly
perform the memorization task, albeit the high load subjects took longer and did so with less
success.
The results of Table 3 suggest that the subjects attempted to correctly respond to the
memorization task however, it is possible that response times would not capture the perceived
likelihood of payment. To account for this possibility, we employ a di¤erent measure of the
subjects expectation of payment in that period: whether the subject correctly responded to
the memorization task in that period. Here we preform an analysis, similar to that summarized
in the Table 2, with two departures. First, we include a variable Correct, which assumes a
value of 1 if the memorization task in that period was performed correctly, and 0 otherwise.
Second, we include the treatment dummy in regression (1). We present a summary of this
analysis in Table 4.
Table 4 Logistic regressions of cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Period  0:0336  0:0399  0:0236  0:0267  0:0267
(0:00572) (0:00627) (0:00752) (0:00801) (0:00801)
Low Load 0:0267   0:376    
(0:1031) (0:201)
Period-Low Load      0:0235  0:0336  0:0336
Interaction (0:0116) (0:0130) (0:0130)
Mixed-Low Load          3:393
Interaction (4:035)
Correct  0:223  0:0637  0:223  0:0650  0:0650
(0:155) (0:186) (0:155) (0:185) (0:185)
Correct p-value 0:15 0:73 0:15 0:73 0:73
Fixed-e¤ects? No Yes No Yes Yes
 2 Log L 2353:39 2049:58 2349:28 2042:78 2042:78
LR 2 34:42 341:05 41:35 347:86 347:86
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, where
* indicates signicance at 0.1, ** indicates signicant at 0.05, and *** indicates
signicance at 0.01. We also provide the p-value for the Correct variable. Each
regression has 1800 observations.
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First, we note that the qualitative results summarized in Table 2 are not a¤ected by the
presence of the Correct variable. In other words, the results are not sensitive to our measure of
the condence that the subject would correctly perform the memorization task in that period.
Second, we note that the Correct variable is not signicant in any of the regressions. Hence,
there does not appear to be a relationship between cooperation and successfully performing
the memorization task in that period.
Finally, to address the possibility that di¤erences in expectations of payment rather than
di¤erences in the cognitive load manipulation are responsible for our results, we again perform
an analysis similar to that summarized in Table 2, but we exclude the observations where the
subject incorrectly responded to the memorization task in that period. Since 820 of the 1020
memorization tasks in the high load treatment were performed correctly, and 766 of the 780
memorization tasks in the low load treatment were performed correctly, in the regressions
below have 1586 observations. We summarize this analysis in Table 5.
Table 5 Logistic regressions of cooperation restricted to correct memorization tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Period  0:0365  0:0447  0:0269  0:0313  0:0313
(0:00615) (0:00679) (0:00849) (0:00905) (0:00905)
Low Load     0:3338    
(0:2110)
Period-Low Load      0:0199  0:0302  0:0302
Interaction (0:0123) (0:0138) (0:0138)
Mixed-Low Load          3:192
Interaction (4:058)
Fixed-e¤ects? No Yes No Yes Yes
 2 Log L 2060:60 1790:24 2351:34 1785:39 1785:39
LR 2 36:09 306:44 39:28 311:29 311:29
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, where
** indicates signicant at 0.05, and *** indicates signicance at 0.01. Each regres-
sion has 1586 observations.
These results suggest that even when we restrict attention to the observations where the
subject successfully performed the memorization task in that period, we still observe conver-
gence to the SPNE behavior. Further, in regressions (4), and (5) we still nd that the low load
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subjects converge to the SPNE behavior at a faster rate than the high load subjects. Whereas
these features are shared by the analysis summarized in Table 2, we note that the outcome of
regression (3) is di¤erent from that of regression (3) in Table 2. We observe that when we
no longer include the observations associated with an incorrect response on the memorization
task, neither the treatment variable nor the treatment-period interaction is signicant. It
is possible that this outcome is due to the fact that regression (3) does not account for the
subject-specic xed-e¤ects. When we account for the subject-specic xed-e¤ects, as we do
in regression (4), we observe that the interaction term is signicant. In light of the analysis
summarized in Tables 3, 4, and 5, we o¤er the following result.
Result 2 There is no evidence that subjects played the game when they were certain that
they would not correctly perform the memorization task. Further, when we account for the
outcome of the memorization task, we still nd evidence of convergence to SPNE behavior
across treatments and that low load subjects converge at a faster rate than the high load
subjects.
3.4 Learning and response times
A natural question is then, "Are the cognitive load treatments thinking di¤erently about the
game?" To answer this question, we analyze the response times of the subjects in selecting
the action in the game. Recall that the experiment was designed in a manner which would
reduce the incentive to alter the optimal decision time in the game stage because the subject
would not necessarily proceed to the memorization task response stage. As such, we use the
response time in the game stage as a measure the nature of the deliberation in the game. We
run the following three regressions with the time remaining in the game stage as the dependent
variable In other words, the size of our dependent variable is increasing in the speed of the
decision. The results are summarized in Table 6.
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Table 6 Time remaining at the decision in game stage
(1) (2) (3)
Period 0:247 0:193 0:193
(0:0148) (0:0242) (0:0196)
Low Load    4:053  
(0:651)
Period-Low Load Interaction   0:126 0:126
(0:0367) (0:0297)
Fixed-e¤ects? Yes No Yes
R2 0:43 0:12 0:44
Linear regressions with a dependent variable of time remaining in the game
decision, where *** indicates signicance at 0.01. Each regression has 1800 ob-
servations.
Table 6 provides evidence that there was a great deal of learning across periods. In all
three specications there is a positive relationship between the period and the speed of the
decision. This suggests that, as the experiment proceeded, the game decision became more
automatic and required fewer cognitive resources. Table 6 also suggests that the subjects
in the low load treatment reected on the decision longer than did the high load subjects.
Finally, the result of regressions (2) and (3) suggest that the low load subjects exhibited faster
learning across periods than did the subjects in the high load treatment, as demonstrated by
the positive interaction term.
In our view, the results of Table 6 suggest an explanation for the results of Table 2.
As previous research has indicated, a longer response time is associated with more strategic
and less automatic reasoning. Therefore, the signicant, positive estimates of the period
coe¢ cients in Table 6 suggest that the subjects are becoming familiar with the game. This
seems to provide an explanation for the observation of the convergence to the SPNE behavior.
The results of Table 6 also suggest that the low load subjects are becoming familiar with the
game at a faster rate than are the high load subjects. Again this suggests an explanation
for the result that the behavior of subjects in the low load treatment converged to the SPNE
behavior at a faster rate than that of the high load subjects.
We also note that, unlike Table 2, Table 6 demonstrates that the treatment dummy is
signicant at 0:01. In particular, we observe that subjects in the high load treatment had a
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shorter response time than the low load subjects. A possible explanation for this relationship
is that the high load subjects exhibited a lower marginal benet of time thinking about the
game, because of the more di¢ cult memorization task. This provides an explanation for
the observation that the high load subjects make their selection in the game at a faster rate.
Regardless of the explanation of the signicance of the treatment variable, this explanation
would not explain that the results involving the period and the period-treatment interaction
terms. We summarize the response time analysis with the following result.
Result 3: Throughout the experiment, subjects in both treatments exhibited decreasing
response times in the game stage, however the response times of low load subjects decreased
at a faster rate than the response times of high load subjects.
3.5 Di¤erences in game outcomes
Despite these di¤erences in behavior, it is unclear whether there are corresponding di¤erences
in game outcomes. We perform an analysis, similar to that summarized in Table 2, except that
the dependent variable is the outcome of the game and we perform the analysis with ordered
multinomial logistic regressions. For the purposes of the analysis below, we do not account for
the accuracy in the memorization task. In other words, in the regressions below, we use the
payo¤s which would have been earned had the memorization task been performed correctly.
For this reason, we describe the dependent variable to be provisional payo¤s. Note that up
to this point, we what now describe as provisional payo¤s, we referred to as game outcomes.
We will henceforth use the term provisional payo¤s. These regressions are summarized in
Table 7.
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Table 7 Ordered multinomial logistic regressions of provisional payo¤s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Period  0:0311  0:0337  0:0269  0:0288  0:0288
(0:0050) (0:00508) (0:00662) (0:0067) (0:00671)
Low Load     0:301    
(0:1780)
Period-Low Load      0:00979  0:0112  0:0112
Interaction (0:0100) (0:0102) (0:0102)
Mixed-Low Load          8:349
Interaction (3:460)
Fixed-e¤ects? No Yes No Yes Yes
 2 Log L 4921:75 4615:37 4917:88 4614:16 4614:16
LR 2 38:60 344:99 42:47 346:19 346:19
Ordered multinomial logistic regressions with a dependent variable of provi-
sional payo¤s earned in the stage game. We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with
standard errors in parentheses, where * indicates signicance at 0.1,** indicates
signicance at 0.05, and *** indicates signicance at 0.01. Each regression has
1800 observations.
We nd evidence that the provisional payo¤s were decreasing across periods. This result
is not surprising because, as we found earlier, the behavior of the subjects was converging to
the SPNE behavior. We also nd that the low load dummy variable is signicant only at the
0.10 level. Again, this is not surprising because we found a similar relationship between the
low load dummy and behavior. However, we do not nd evidence that the provisional payo¤s
of the low treatment subjects converged at a rate di¤erent than that of the high load subjects.
In our view, this is surprising because the previous analysis suggested a strong di¤erence in
the convergence of the behavior of the subjects in the high and low treatments.
In regression (5), we nd that the convergence result and the lack of signicance in the
di¤erence in rates of convergence are not a¤ected by the inclusion of the mixed-treatment
interaction. Although we do not present this analysis in Table 7, we also note that these
results qualitative are not a¤ected by a variable indicating whether the memorization task
was correctly performed in that period. Further, we note that our results continue to hold
when the analysis is conducted as a linear regression rather than as logits. We summarize
this analysis with the following result.
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Result 4 The provisional payo¤s of the subjects converged to the provisional payo¤s
predicted by the SPNE outcome. However, there were not signicant di¤erences in the
convergence of the provisional payo¤s across the treatments.
3.6 Di¤erences in ability to condition on previous outcomes
On the one hand, we found that the behavior in the low load treatment converged to the SPNE
behavior faster than those in the high load treatments (see Tables 2 and 4). On the other
hand, we found that the analogous result did not hold for provisional payo¤s. Specically,
the provisional payo¤s of the high and low load treatments did not converge at a di¤erent
rate (see Table 7). We now consider a possible explanation for these two seemingly dissonant
results: perhaps the low load subjects were better able to condition on previous outcomes,
and this additional agility o¤set the trend of playing uncooperatively.
In order to explore this explanation, we o¤er a model of cooperation which is possibly
dependent on previous outcomes. In other words, we explore the extent to which subjects
were able to condition play on the outcomes of previous periods. In the analysis described
below, we assume that the subject considers features of these previous outcomes to be state
variables upon play can be conditioned. In other words, we do not intend to provide a model
of learning.
We now describe two such variables upon which the subject could condition. One possi-
bility is that the subjects would condition play on the number of other players in the group
who played cooperatively in the previous period. In other words, we compare the action
selected in period t with the number of other group members who played cooperatively in
period t  1. In the description below, we refer to this variable as Lagged Number of Others
Playing X. Note that this variable can range from 0 to 3. Another possibility is that subjects
would condition play on the change in cooperation between the previous period and the period
preceding that. In other words, we compare the action selected in period t with the di¤erence
between the number of other group members who played cooperatively in period t 1 and the
number who played cooperatively in period t  2. We refer to this variable as Lagged Change
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in Others Playing X. Note that this variable can range from  3 to 3. Finally, we include the
three relevant interaction terms. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 8.
Table 8 Fixed-e¤ects logistic regressions of cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Number of Others Playing X 0:0523    0:0733  0:196
(0:0849) (0:125) (0:128)
Interaction with Low Load 0:0677   0:431 0:397
(0:133) (0:197) (0:199)
Lagged Change in Others Playing X   0:0753  0:0142 0:0786
(0:0621) (0:110) (0:112)
Interaction with Low Load    0:112  0:317  0:312
(0:097) (0:137) (0:138)
Lagged Number of Others Playing X     0:0947 0:0825
-Lagged Change Interaction (0:0517) (0:0521)
Period        0:0340
(0:00736)
 2 Log L 1987:63 1894:62 1885:26 1863:54
LR 2 302:54 313:43 322:79 344:52
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, where
* indicates signicance at 0.1, ** indicates signicance at 0.05, and *** indicates
signicance at 0.01. Due to the nature of the lagged variables, regression (1) has
1740 observations and regressions (2)   (4) have 1680 observations.
In regression (1) we do not observe a signicant relationship. In particular, we do not
observe a relationship between cooperation and the number of others playing cooperatively
in the previous period. Further there is not a signicant di¤erence between the sensitivity of
the high load subjects to the number of others playing cooperatively in the previous period
and the sensitivity of the low load subjects. In regression (2), we observe a similar lack of
signicance as in regression (1). There we do not nd evidence that lagged change in others
playing cooperatively is related to cooperation. Finally, we do not observe a signicant
relationship between the sensitivity of the high load subjects to the change in cooperation and
the sensitivity of the low load subjects.
However, in regression (3) signicant relationships emerge. Although again neither mea-
sure of previous cooperation is signicant, we do observe a di¤erential sensitivity to both
measures of previous cooperation. We nd that the low load subjects were more sensitive to
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the number of others playing cooperatively in the previous period than the high load subjects.
Additionally, the low load subjects were more sensitive to the change cooperation than the
high load subjects. In regression (4) we also account for the period in which the decision was
made. Here we still observe a the signicance of the di¤erential sensitivity for both measures.
Consider the signs of the signicant variables in regressions (3) and (4). We note that the
interaction between the treatment and Number of Others Playing X is positive. This suggests
that low load subjects were more likely than high load subjects to cooperate in response to
a high level of cooperation in the previous period. We also note that interaction between
the treatment and the Change in Others Playing X is negative. This suggests that low load
subjects were more likely than high load subjects to play uncooperatively in response to an
increase in cooperation between the previous period and the period preceding the previous
period.
Although the lack of signicance in regressions (1) and (2) above, seems dissonant to the
signicance in regressions (3) and (4), intuition on the matter is relatively straightforward.
Behavior is not exclusively a function of the level of cooperation in the previous period or
exclusively a function of the change in the cooperation, but it is a function of both variables.
Consider a subject making a decision regarding cooperation, where 2 of the 3 other subjects
played cooperatively in the previous period. By itself, the number of cooperators in the
previous period has no context, and is therefore not a su¢ cient basis on which to make the
choice. If the number of cooperators rose from 1 to 2, the subject could regard that as
di¤erent from the situation in which the number of cooperators fell from 3 to 2. Therefore,
it is not surprising that signicant relationships only emerge when we consider both the level
of cooperation and the change in cooperation.
To further analyze the role of cognitive load in the sensitivity of cooperation to previous
outcomes, we run the following xed-e¤ects logistic regressions. In the rst regression we
restrict attention to high load subjects. In the second regression we restrict attention to low
load subjects. The results are summarized in Table 9.
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Table 9 Restricted xed-e¤ects logistic regressions of cooperation
High Load Low Load
Lagged Number of Others Playing X  0:0706 0:354
(0:125) (0:154)
Lagged Change in Others Playing X 0:0252  0:385
(0:123) (0:145)
Lagged Number of Others Playing X 0:0639 0:138
-Lagged Change Interaction (0:0677) (0:0802)
 2 Log L 1128:28 756:487
LR 2 126:12 197:078
Observations 952 728
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, where
* indicates signicance at 0.1, ** indicates signicance at 0.05, and *** indicates
signicance at 0.01
The High Load regression suggests that none of the variables are related to cooperation
for the high load subjects. By contrast, the Low Load regression indicates that each of
the variables attains a level of signicance. In particular, the number of others playing
cooperatively is signicantly related to cooperation of the low load subjects at the 0:05 level.
Further, the lagged change in others playing cooperatively is related to cooperation for the
low load subjects at the 0:01 level. Together the results in Tables 8 and 9 suggest that the
behavior of the low load subjects was more sensitive to previous outcomes than the behavior
of the high load subjects. We summarize the analysis of Tables 8 and 9 with the following
result.
Result 5: There is evidence that the low load subjects were better able to condition on
previous outcomes than the high load subjects.
3.7 Discussion
In the experiment described above, we found that behavior of both high and low load subjects
in the multi-player prisoners dilemma converged to the SPNE behavior. However, across all
periods, we found only very weak evidence of a di¤erence in the behavior of the high and low
treatments. We note another signicant relationship: the behavior of the low load subjects
converged to the uncooperative SPNE prediction at a faster rate than that of the high load
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subjects. However, when we performed the similar analysis, but with the provisional payo¤s,
we note that there was no di¤erential convergence of game outcomes across treatments.
One potential explanation for these two seemingly incongruent results is that low load
subjects were better able to condition behavior on previous outcomes, and this agility o¤set
the general trend towards the uncooperative outcomes. We found evidence that the low
load subjects could, better than high load subjects, sustain cooperation when the level of
cooperation in the previous period was high. We also found evidence that the low load
subjects were more likely, than high load subjects, to play uncooperatively when there was an
increase in the level of cooperation between the two previous periods. In other words, it seems
that the low load subjects were better able to identify advantageous, temporary situations in
which additional surplus could be captured.
So it seems that, while subjects in the high load treatments converged to the selsh out-
comes more slowly than the low load subjects, and this would seem to imply higher provisional
payo¤s, this benet of cooperation seems to have been o¤set by their reduced ability to condi-
tion actions on previous outcomes. The net result of these two e¤ects, which work in opposite
directions, resulted in no signicant di¤erences in the convergence rate of the provisional
payo¤s.
4 Conclusion
So are there brains in games? And if so, what else can we say? Our results suggest a qualied
yes to the rst question. Given our manipulation of the availability of cognitive resources in
our particular strategic environment, we found that di¤erences in cognitive resources imply
di¤erences in strategic behavior.
Regarding the second question, the answer is somewhat delicate. We found that the
behavior of low load subjects converged to the SPNE behavior at a faster rate than the high
load subjects. However, we found no di¤erences in the convergence of the provisional payo¤s.
To reconcile these two results, we note that the low load subjects were better able to condition
their play on previous outcomes. This agility of the low load subjects seems to have allowed
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them to identify advantageous, temporary situations and the ability to capture the available
surplus.
There appear to be two ways to interpret the results of the experiment. On the one hand,
the reader who is not sympathetic to behavioral arguments could point to the evidence of
the convergence towards the SPNE behavior across cognitive load treatments. Indeed, we
found that subjects, even in the high load treatment, exhibited behavior which converged to
that predicted by the theory. This seems to support the claim that subjects, even those with
diminished cognitive resources, will eventually learn from their mistakes and therefore intelli-
gence is ultimately of limited concern in strategic settings. Further, the lack of signicance
of the treatment dummy variable in the results involving cooperation or provisional payo¤s,
could also be used to support the claim that the cognitive resources available to the subject
is of limited interest in a strategic setting.
On the other hand, the reader who is more sympathetic to behavioral arguments could
note that the di¤erences between the cognitive resources available to the subjects were directly
related to the di¤erences in the rate of the convergence to the SPNE behavior. Indeed, we
found that the subjects in the low load treatment converged to the equilibrium behavior at
a faster rate than did the subjects in the high load treatment. Further, we found evidence
that the low load subjects were more sensitive than high load subjects to previous outcomes.
These results seem to o¤er support to the claim that the cognitive resources available to the
subject are of interest in strategic settings. Despite the position of the reader, we hope that
this experiment begins to clarify the role of cognitive resources in strategic settings.
The relationship between cognitive resources and play in games is also of interest to re-
searchers who study nonequilibrium models. In response to the mounting evidence that
subjects rarely play according to the equilibrium predictions, researchers have been turning
their attention to nonequilibrium models which can account for hierarchical levels of thinking
(Camerer et al., 2004; Costa-Gomes, et al. 2001). It would seem natural to expect that the
intelligence of the subject would be related the level of strategic sophistication of the subject.
However, Georganas et al. (2010) found that the mapping of measures of intelligence to the es-
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timated hierarchical level of thinking varies across games. While there could be other reasons
for this negative result,15 evidence of this kind is crucial in supporting existing nonequilibrium
models or in suggesting modications to existing models. While the repeated nature of our
experiment does not allow a clean comparison to this literature, our paper suggests that it
could be fruitful to investigate the relationship between the nonequilibrium models and the
intelligence of subjects, through the application of a di¤erential cognitive load.
There remain several interesting and unanswered questions. For instance, it is unclear
how the results would be a¤ected by a game other than the multi-player prisoners dilemma.
In other words, it is unclear how our results would be a¤ected by an increase (i.e., a public
goods game or auction) or a decrease (i.e., a two-player prisoners dilemma) in the complexity
of the game. We hope that future work will examine the relationship between cognitive load
e¤ects and the complexity of games.
Another unanswered question relates to the signicance of the incentives regarding the
memorization task. While our cognitive load manipulation was successful, and we found no
evidence of a relationship between cooperation and whether the memorization task was correct
in that period, it is possible that the subjects exhibited an income e¤ect. In other words, since
payment was only made when the memorization task was correct, and the memorization task
for the high load subjects was more di¢ cult, it is possible that the subjects acted di¤erently
as a result of the nancial incentives rather than the di¤erential cognitive resources. We also
hope that future work can address the e¤ect of our incentives.
Finally, note that we only applied a cognitive load during the stage in which the subjects
selected an action in the game. We conjecture that our results would be strengthened if the
load was applied during both the game decision stage and the feedback stage. However, only
future work would be able to test this conjecture.
15See Crawford et al. (2010).
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Appendix
The screen during the game decision:
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